The Neuroscience of Distributive Justice

Since the emergence of philosophical thought, an unresolved debate has persisted about a general definition of justice and equity. An aspect of that debate involves distributive justice, or how goods and benefits should be dispersed throughout a society in a fair and just manner. As an extreme example of this dilemma, imagine you are commissioned to deliver 100 lbs. of food to a famine-stricken region that consists of two villages a hundred miles apart. If you deliver half of the food to the first village, then travel to the second, 30 lbs. of the food will spoil during the trip. Would you deliver all of the food to the first village, or provide each village with only 35 lbs. of food in the pursuit of equity? What if you knew that 35 lbs. of food was not enough to fully alleviate the suffering of either village until the next shipment of food arrived?

Philosophers have offered several solutions to debates of this nature. Utilitarianism, a concept with ancient roots but most frequently associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, asserts that one’s primary goal should be the achievement of a maximal amount of good or happiness. In the situation described above, a utilitarian might opt to deliver all of the food to the first village. This would maximize the sum of individual fulfillment, while the halving of the food would maintain a static level of suffering. Thus, delivering all of the food to the first village is the greater good.

Another approach to such a quandary is known as deontological ethics, which emphasizes not the consequences of one’s actions, but whether the actions are right or wrong, just or unjust. From a deontological perspective, it would be unjust to distribute the food unequally. A desire for some degree of fairness in all dealings seems to be a universal human trait, something deontologists point to in support of their doctrine.

Another question about distributive justice involves the extent to which emotion plays a role in the decisions it calls for. Many philosophers, both ancient and contemporary, assert that rational thinking is what allows us to make choices in difficult situations like the one above. Others argue that the processes behind those decisions cannot be devoid of an emotional influence, specifically one of an empathetic or sympathetic nature.

A study in this week’s Science examines distributive justice from a neural perspective, asking: what areas of the brain are active when we make such decisions? To find out, researchers used fMRI to scan the brains of 26 adults while they made decisions about allocating money to groups of children living in an orphanage in Uganda. During the allocations, the participants were forced to make a number of decisions that involved trade-offs between efficiency (analogous to Utilitarianism) and equity (deontology).

The investigators found that distinct neural regions are activated in the consideration of equity and efficiency. The putamen, a mid-brain structure that forms part of the dorsal striatum, seemed to be correlated specifically with efficiency. On the other hand, activity in the bilateral insular cortex was correlated with inequity. Regions of the caudate were activated by both. They also found that individual differences in aversion to inequity corresponded with higher neural activity in the insula.

Overall, the participants showed the greatest neural reaction to an inequitable distribution of food, leading the authors of the study to speculate that distributive decisions are made to avoid inequality more so than to engender efficiency. Thus, the results of this experiment seem to support the deontological argument. As the insular cortex is thought to play an important role in emotional processing, the experiment also indicates that our decisions are not devoid of an emotional element (contrary to the beliefs of Kant and Plato).

Thus, the imaging evidence from this study may help to explain why the debate over distributive justice has never been resolved. The concepts of equity and efficiency, and their respective values, are deeply rooted in our brains. Perhaps evolution never resulted in the disappearance of one or the other because they both are valuable in the decision-making process, depending on the situation. When all is said and done, though, it may be that the evolutionary value of fairness overrides that of efficiency.

Reference:

Hsu, M., Anen, C., Quartz, S.R. (2008). The Right and the Good: Distributive Justice and Neural Encoding of Equity and Efficiency. Science, 320(5879), 1092-1095. DOI: 10.1126/science.1153651

Does Money Affect the Way You Think?

Money, perhaps more so than any other modern symbol, can elicit a vast array of emotions (depending to a large degree on its abundance in one’s life), including yearning, anxiety, pride, greed, envy, depression, and happiness. Of course there is not simply a direct correlation with money and any one of these emotional states, such as more money equaling more happiness or vice versa. In fact, past research has found that the effects money has on one’s well-being can be very disparate. On one hand, having more money may be good for your health and emotional state. On the other, people who place a high value on money have been found to have poorer social relationships than those who are more moderate in their view toward the attainment of wealth.

A group of researchers recently conducted a series of experiments to explore this paradoxical aspect of affluence. They formulated two hypotheses about the dual nature of money in the modern world. First, since money is the basis of most exchange in today’s society, they suggested that the thought of money should make people more focused on cost-benefit analyses and a market-pricing view of their environment. They thought that this perspective might encourage more emphasis on individual performance, since money is often correlated with the completion of personal tasks in our business-based economy. They predicted people with money on their mind would think of life in terms of inputs and outputs, with an awareness that greater input should result in a greater output.

They also hypothesized that the market mentality, while beneficial for personal performance, might hinder one’s ability to interact socially. Because it fosters a focus on individual performance, it might cause a decrease in sensitivity towards the needs of others.

To test their hypotheses, they used several different methods of exposing participants to money-related cues, while attempting to make the cues subtle enough that the subjects wouldn’t be aware of their presence. In one experiment, some participants sat at a desk with a screensaver that depicted money, while others saw screensavers of fish or flowers. In another, participants had to organize phrases that were or were not related to money, such as “I cashed a check” or “I wrote the letter”. Several other methods of exposure to money cues were used.

After being exposed to the cues, the participants were put in various social situations that tested their desire to be helpful, generous, sociable, or industrious. For example, to test willingness to help, a confederate would walk by and drop a handful of pencils (27 to be exact). Or, in another situation, a confused colleague would ask for assistance in understanding a task they were attempting to complete. Those who were exposed to money cues picked up fewer pencils, and those who weren’t spent 120% more time helping the confused colleague.

When given an opportunity to donate a portion of $2 the participants were given at the start of the study, those who had been reminded of money donated 39% of their payment, while those who hadn’t been donated 67%. They also, when allowed to situate the chairs in a room while waiting for another person to arrive, put more distance between their chair and the other person’s than the money-naïve group. When given a list of solo vs. group activities to take part in, the money-exposed group chose more individual activities than the control group (even when some activities included family members and friends).

With the choice of working on a task alone or getting help from a peer, the money-reminded participants chose to work alone, even though it meant doing more work. When faced with a challenging task, they spent 48% more time working at it before seeking help from the experimenter.

The researchers suggest these results may appear because a money-oriented person is focused on the inputs and outputs of the market, a view that tends to lead to an emphasis on individualization and self-sufficiency. They found no changes in emotion between the two groups, and thus assert that the differences in behavior are probably not due to a distrusting of others. Additionally, the fact that those who were reminded of money chose to persist on a task before asking for help indicates the results are not based purely on selfishness, as a selfish person would not have been so eager to do more work than necessary.

Regardless, the results do suggest that money can inspire an aversion to social interaction and a focus on the self. In modicum, however, this may be a necessary part of a capitalistic society, where one is forced to place an emphasis on ensuring they are treated equitably and compensated fairly for their work—and where they are forced to compete for their livelihood. An interesting follow-up to this experiment would be to use neuroimaging to see what is going on in the brains of participants when they make decisions after exposure to money cues, and how it is different from controls.


Reference:

Vohs, K.D., Mead, N.L., Goode, M.R. (2008). Merely Activating the Concept of Money Changes Personal and Interpersonal Behavior . Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(3), (in press).

microRNAs and Schizophrenia

Over the past twenty years, our understanding of gene expression has grown tremendously. As is often the case, however, with that increased level of comprehension has come a realization that the process is even more complex than originally thought. Thus, the relatively simple model of mRNA being transcribed from DNA, then traveling to ribosomes where it is translated into proteins (with the help of tRNA and rRNA), is now thought to be just a rough summary of the process. A number of other molecules, such as transcription factors (TFs) and microRNAs (miRNAs), are also involved in the expression of genes.

TFs are proteins that bind to sections of DNA and control the transfer of genetic information from DNA to RNA. They are integral to development, management of the cell cycle, responding to environmental changes, and intercellular communication. miRNAs are small, single-stranded RNA molecules that are transcribed by DNA but not translated into proteins. They are complementary to a particular section of mRNA, and by binding to mRNA can suppress gene expression. TFs and miRNAs can control anywhere from dozens to hundreds of genes in the human genome, with some estimates being much higher.

Fully understanding the role of TFs and miRNAs is essential for uncovering the etiology of genetically based disorders. Recently researchers at Columbia University Medical Center (CUMC) found that changes in miRNA levels can result in cognitive and behavioral deficits. They believe miRNAs could be involved in the development of schizophrenia in humans.

In the past, a higher incidence of schizophrenia has been correlated with a deletion of a small part of chromosome 22, at a location designated as q11.2. One of the genes in that chromosomal section is called Dgcr8. It plays an integral role in miRNA production. Thus, the researchers at CUMC hypothesized that the absence of Dgcr8 and the resultant reduction in miRNAs might be part of the etiology of schizophrenia.

They engineered a strain of mice that lacked the Dgcr8 gene. As they predicted, the mice were found to exhibit the same behavioral and neuroanatomical deficits seen in people with schizophrenia.

While this is an important step in understanding one of the most perplexing disorders medicine has ever had to confront, it is not exactly heartening. miRNAs have widespread effects on gene expression throughout the brain. This may help to explain why schizophrenia has been so difficult to decipher, as it is probably the result of a number of genetic aberrations. Unfortunately, though, it is further indication that schizophrenia is very complex, and much more investigation will be needed to fully comprehend its origin.

Would You Vaccinate Your Kids Against Drugs?

This is not just a question intended to incite thought or debate, it’s an issue that any future parents, or parents with children under the age of 10 may actually be faced with before your child reaches 18. Clinical trials are currently underway for vaccines intended to treat cocaine and nicotine addiction, respectively. Both have been shown to be effective without any adverse effects in phase I trials, and have moved on to phase II. So, if the treatments continue to demonstrate efficacy without harm, it is conceivable they could be available for use in humans within a decade.

Cocaine has proven to be one of the most frustrating drugs of abuse for the pharmacology field because, unlike heroin (methadone), alcohol (naltrexone), and nicotine (buproprion, nicotine gums, etc.), no accepted pharmaceutical treatment for cocaine dependence has been developed. Yet cocaine is one the most addictive drugs of abuse, as well as one the most widely used, with over 14 million users across the globe. According to Scientific American, reducing the rate of cocaine use in the United States alone could result in a savings of $745 million in medical, legal, and other related expenses.

A failure to find acceptable methods of treatment for cocaine addiction has led researchers to investigate the plausibility of using immunotherapy. Immunotherapy involves administering a vaccine to raise an immune response against the drug. In order to do this, the drug must be delivered along with an immunogen, or antigen. An immunogen is a substance, often a protein, which can cause an immune response. Since the drug obviously cannot raise an immune response itself (or drugs wouldn’t be so popular), the drug is linked to an antigen and then administered to the patient. When the immune system senses the presence of the antigen, antibodies bind to it. This antibody-immunogen complex is too large to pass the blood-brain barrier, causing most of the drug to be unable to enter the central nervous system (CNS). This drastically reduces the influence of the drug, for the most part eliminating the rewarding quality of its use.

Since initial vaccines were developed, research has uncovered even more effective methods of vaccination against cocaine use. A few years ago a group at The Scripps Research Institute found a monoclonal antibody that has an extremely high affinity for cocaine. When displayed on the coat of a bacteriophage, they found the antibody could be carried past the blood-brain barrier and into the CNS, where it could be even more efficient at diminishing the effects of cocaine.

A bacteriophage is a virus that infects bacteria. They usually are made up of genetic material enclosed by a protein coat. Despite the nocuous connotation to their name, they are not dangerous to eukaryotic cells. They are useful as vectors because they tend to be very durable and able to withstand great variations in external conditions. Their ability to pass through the blood-brain barrier made them a great candidate for an immunogen. Their use in this study resulted in significant reductions in the psychostimulant effects of cocaine on rats.

A form of this vaccine developed by The Scripps Research Institute is now working its way through the clinical trial process. A vaccine against cocaine or nicotine would still necessitate some aspect of compliance, however. From most indications, a vaccine would require several injections over a period of up to 3 months to take effect. After that, regular vaccinations every 2 to 6 months would probably be necessary.

So, for adults, the desire to get treatment (or a court-ordered treatment in certain situations) would be a necessary first step. For minors, however, it’s conceivable a parent could be given the option of mandating a vaccination schedule, whether it be therapeutic or preventative. So, for all you parents with children who won’t be 18 within the next decade, what will you do?

Important associations between a drug and its rewarding quality are made within the first several uses of the drug. Would you take the steps to vaccinate your child against nicotine, so that when she tries cigarettes the first few times she will spit them away with disgust and wonder what the big fuss is all about? Or against cocaine, so if he is at a party and happens to try it, he will not experience a rewarding effect? Would you tell her that you are vaccinating her? If you did, it might still allow her to harbor some curiosity about drug use, as she would know that, while vaccinated, she’s not experiencing its “real” effects. This could make him more inclined to try a drug after age 18, when you can no longer have such a peremptory influence. Think about it, it may be a decision you will one day have to make…


Reference:

Carrera, M.R. (2004). From the Cover: Treating cocaine addiction with viruses. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(28), 10416-10421. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0403795101

Encephalon #45

It is up at PodBlack Blog, in tribute to Erik Erikson on the anniversary of his death. Enjoy and mourn, in whatever proportion you deem appropriate.